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Abstract 
 
There is a trade-off between specificity and accuracy in existing models of belief.  
Descriptions of agents in the tripartite model, which recognizes only three doxastic 
attitudes—belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment—are typically accurate, but not 
sufficiently specific.  The orthodox Bayesian model, which requires real-valued 
credences, is perfectly specific, but often inaccurate: we often lack precise credences.  I 
argue, first, that a popular attempt to fix the Bayesian model by using sets of functions is 
also inaccurate, since it requires us to have interval-valued credences with perfectly 
precise endpoints.  We can see this problem as analogous to the problem of higher order 
vagueness.  Ultimately, I argue, the only way to avoid these problems is to endorse 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability.  This principle has some surprising and radical 
consequences.  For example, it entails that the trade-off between accuracy and specificity 
is in-principle unavoidable: sometimes it is simply impossible to characterize an agent’s 
doxastic state in a way that is both fully accurate and maximally specific.  What we can 
do, however, is improve on both the tripartite and existing Bayesian models.  I construct a 
new model of belief—the minimal model—that allows us to characterize agents with 
much greater specificity than the tripartite model, and yet which remains, unlike existing 
Bayesian models, perfectly accurate. 
 
0. Introduction 
 
 Much traditional epistemology employs a tripartite model of belief, which 
recognizes three doxastic attitudes: belief, disbelief and suspension of judgment.  
However, this model is too coarse-grained.  Its descriptions of agents are typically 
accurate, but they are not sufficiently specific.  For example, one may believe both P1 
and P2, and yet be more confident of one than the other.  The tripartite model is blind to 
these differences in confidence, and yet they are crucially important (for example, in the 
explanation of action).   
 Observations like these are often taken to motivate the orthodox Bayesian model, 
which recognizes uncountably many different doxastic attitudes: one for each real 
number between 0 and 1.  However, this model suffers from the opposite problem.  It is 
too fine-grained.  Descriptions of agents in this model are perfectly specific—reflecting 
even the subtlest differences in confidence—but this comes at the cost of accuracy.  
Sometimes we lack precise, point-valued credences. 
 The tripartite model, then, has accuracy without specificity; the orthodox 
Bayesian model has specificity without accuracy.  One aim of this paper is to present 
powerful reasons for the claim that this trade-off between accuracy and specificity in the 
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representation of belief is in principle unavoidable: it is simply not possible to represent 
belief in a way that is both fully accurate and maximally specific. 
 What we can do, however, is improve on both the tripartite and orthodox 
Bayesian models.  Another aim of the paper is to construct and promote a new model of 
belief—the minimal model—which allows for much greater specificity than the tripartite 
model, and yet which remains, unlike the orthodox Bayesian model, perfectly accurate. 
I begin in section 1 by discussing a popular attempt to improve on the orthodox 
Bayesian model by using a set of functions to represent an agent, rather than a single 
function.  It will turn out that this set-of-functions model suffers from a slightly different 
version of the same sort of inaccuracy; specifically, it requires interval-valued credences 
with perfectly precise endpoints.  An analogy between credal imprecision and vagueness 
will reveal that the set-of-functions model is analogous to supervaluationism, and the 
problem of interval endpoint precision analogous to the problem of higher-order 
vagueness.  We’ll see that other approaches to vagueness inspire analogous models of 
belief, but many suffer from analogs of some version of the higher-order vagueness 
problem. 
 In section 2 I argue that the only way to avoid these problems is by endorsing a 
surprising and radical principle I call Insurmountable Unclassifiability.  I then ask what 
can be said about the representation of belief if this principle is true.  As a preliminary to 
answering, in section 3 I present a novel way of using sets of functions, and intervals, to 
characterize doxastic states.  This minimal model allows us to give multiple accurate 
characterizations of the same agent at different levels of specificity.   
 The minimal model has two primary virtues.  First, it constitutes an improvement 
over the tripartite model and both existing Bayesian models, in that it allows for much 
greater specificity than the tripartite model, and yet, unlike existing Bayesian models, 
remains fully accurate.  Second, it is neutral on the issues that divide defenders of 
different views on credal imprecision and higher order vagueness.  Thus, it provides a 
framework within which we can make progress on a wide range of questions in 
epistemology and decision theory without having to first take a stand on these difficult 
and controversial issues. 
In section 4 I make use of the minimal model in showing that if Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability is true, then the trade-off between accuracy and specificity in the 
representation of belief is in principle unavoidable: it is impossible to characterize an 
agent’s doxastic state in a way that is both fully accurate and maximally specific.   
 Insurmountable Unclassifiability is a radical and mysterious view, however, as 
becomes apparent in section 5, where I discuss the forced march scenario.  In section 6 I 
display some advantages of the view by showing how it can dissolve two challenging 
problems: puzzle cases for the Principle of Indifference, and diachronic decision 
problems for agents who lack precise credences.   
Ultimately I do not come down one way or the other on whether we should accept 
this fascinating view.  My aim is only to argue that there is a powerful reason in favor of 
it—namely, that it is necessary for avoiding the analogous problems of inaccuracy due to 
overprecision in the representation of belief, and higher order vagueness—and to begin 
exploring some of its consequences. 
 
1. The Vagueness Analogy 
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 In this section, I begin by spotlighting the problem faced by the orthodox 
Bayesian model.  Then I discuss a popular attempt to fix this problem by using a set of 
functions, rather than a single function.  I point out that this set-of-functions model faces 
a problem very similar to the one that undermined the single-function model.  Pursuing 
an analogy between credal imprecision and vagueness helps us gain deeper insight into 
the nature of these problems.  In particular, we can see the set-of-functions model as 
analogous to the supervaluationist approach to vagueness, and the problem facing this 
model as analogous to a well-known problem for supervaluationism, sometimes called 
the problem of higher-order vagueness.  I then briefly review two other approaches to 
vagueness: an infinite hierarchy of borderline cases, and many-valued logics.  In each 
case, we see that it would be possible to construct an analogous model of belief, but that 
the resulting model would suffer from a version of the higher-order vagueness problem. 
 The orthodox Bayesian model represents the doxastic state of an agent by a 
function which assigns to each proposition some real number between 0 and 1.  However, 
our confidence levels are not always that precise.  For example, consider LUCKY, the 
proposition that you will find a four-leaf clover tomorrow.  I could inquire about your 
level of confidence in LUCKY, and demand that you choose exactly one real number 
between 0 and 1, precise down to the millionth decimal place (and beyond)—but there 
would be an element of arbitrariness in any choice you might make.
1, 2
 
 One popular attempt to fix this problem involves using a set of functions to 
represent each agent, rather than a single function.  (Proponents include Jeffrey (1983), 
van Fraassen (1990), and Joyce (2005, 2010).)  This set generates interval-valued 
credences; one’s credence in P is the interval which contains all and only the real 
numbers r such that some function in one’s set has Pr(P) = r. 
 However, this model faces a problem much like the one that undermined the 
single-function model.  The problem of arbitrariness resurfaces, just in a slightly different 
form.  What, exactly, is the upper endpoint of your interval-valued credence for LUCKY?  
.0001?  .00009?  .000121?  Again, any particular number seems arbitrary.
3
 
 We can gain a deeper understanding of these problems of arbitrariness by 
pursuing an analogy between credal imprecision and vagueness.  To begin, I’ll define a 
predicate MC.  Roughly, MC applies to numbers that represent credences greater than 
your level of confidence in LUCKY.  For a more precise definition, first, let B[r] say that 
                                                 
1
 Some insist that despite appearances to the contrary, every agent does in fact have a precise credence in 
every proposition.  Arguing against this view is beyond the scope of this paper.  Those who are sympathetic 
to it may interpret the paper as aiming to defend the conditional claim that the conclusions pursued here 
will follow, if in fact we sometimes lack precise credences.  
2
 One might object to my presupposition that this inaccuracy in the orthodox Bayesian model is 
problematic.  After all, simplifying idealizations are commonly used with great success in models in 
science.  My reply is simple: whether an idealization is problematic depends entirely on the purpose to 
which the model is put.  For example, if the goal is prediction, an idealization might be unproblematic (and 
even beneficial).  In this paper, however, I evaluate models according to their ability to satisfy a simple 
curiosity about the actual facts—the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth—about the nature of 
our doxastic states.  Relative to this goal, any inaccuracy in the way a model represents our doxastic states 
is automatically a shortcoming. 
3
 The problem of interval endpoint arbitrariness is also raised (though not under that name) in Sturgeon 
(2008, 158) and Maher (2006), and discussed in Kaplan (2010). 
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a coin with bias r towards heads will land heads on the next toss.  For example, B[.7] 
says that a coin with bias .7 towards heads will land heads on the next toss.  Assume that, 
in accordance with rationality, for all r, your credence in B[r] is r.  Then we can define 
MC (for more confident) as the predicate that applies to a number r just in case you’re 
more confident of B[r] than LUCKY. 
 MC is analogous to paradigm vague predicates like TALL.  In each case there is a 
spectrum such that the predicate clearly applies at one end, and clearly fails to apply at 
the other, but there does not seem to be a sharp boundary.  Both seem to admit of 
borderline cases, and give rise to sorites-style paradoxes.   
Importantly, there is a close connection between our lack of a precise credence in 
LUCKY and the vagueness of MC.
4
  If we had some precise credence c in LUCKY, there 
would be a sharp boundary between MC and not-MC: all numbers greater than c would 
have MC, and all numbers equal to or less than c would have not-MC.  A natural thought, 
then, is that credal imprecision is of a piece with the vagueness of predicates like MC. 
 The set-of-functions model is an attempt to account for our lack of precise 
credences, and, thereby, an attempt to account for the vagueness of predicates like MC.  
We can interpret this model along supervaluationist lines: each function in your set is one 
admissible precisification of your doxastic state.  Functions excluded from your set are 
inadmissible precisifications.  A proposition about your doxastic state is determinately 
true if true according to all functions in your set.  It’s indeterminate if true according to 
some, but not all, functions in your set.   
For example, if all functions in your set have Pr(B[.9]) > Pr(LUCKY), it’s 
determinate that you’re more confident of B[.9] than LUCKY, i.e., it’s determinate that 
MC[.9] is true.  If some functions in your set have Pr(B[.0001]) > Pr(LUCKY) while 
others do not, it’s indeterminate whether you’re more confident of B[.0001]) than 
LUCKY, i.e., it’s indeterminate whether MC[.0001] is true.  So, on the supervaluationist 
interpretation, we can see the set-of-functions model as an attempt to account for the 
vagueness of MC by introducing a third category, indeterminately MC, just as the 
supervaluationist tries to account for the vagueness of TALL by introducing a third 
category, indeterminately TALL.
5
 
Supervaluationism faces a well-known problem: it requires a sharp boundary 
where, intuitively, there shouldn’t be one, namely, between the determinate and 
indeterminate.  This is the so-called problem of higher-order vagueness.  On the 
supervaluationist interpretation of the set-of-functions model, the problematic 
requirement of precise endpoints for interval-valued credences is just an instance of this 
more general problem.  A sharp upper endpoint for one’s interval-valued credence in 
LUCKY would constitute a sharp boundary between the numbers to which MC 
determinately applies and those to which it indeterminately applies.  But there is no sharp 
boundary here.
6
 
                                                 
4
 For simplicity I will speak as if MC is vague, but strictly speaking I rely only on the claim that MC is 
structurally analogous to paradigm vague predicates. 
5
 Supervaluationist approaches to vagueness are defended in Fine (1975) and Keefe (2000), among others. 
6
 Unfortunately, the question of how to interpret the set-of-functions model has received very little attention 
in the literature, so although some explicitly endorse the supervaluationist interpretation (including van 
Fraassen (1990, 2005, 2006) and Hajek (2003)), it is unclear how widespread this interpretation is, and 
what alternatives might look like.  One clearly incompatible interpretation appears in Schoenfield (2012) 
and Kaplan (2010): if some functions in your set have Pr(A) > Pr(B), while others have Pr(A) < Pr(B), and 
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As the literature has shown, it is extremely difficult to do justice to higher order 
vagueness.  Below I briefly review a couple of prominent attempts and why they are 
unsatisfactory.  Because of the analogy between credal imprecision and vagueness, in 
each case there is an analogous model of belief that would face analogous problems. 
First, some postulate an infinite hierarchy of borderline cases, borderline 
borderline cases, etc.  For example, indeterminately tall heights are first-order borderline 
cases, but there are also second-order borderline cases: heights that are borderlines of the 
distinction between determinately tall and indeterminately tall.  For every natural number 
n, there are nth-order borderline cases.  This strategy could be employed in an attempt to 
fix the problem of precise endpoints for interval-valued credences: we would account for 
the lack of a sharp line between determinately MC and indeterminately MC by 
postulating borderline cases of that distinction, and so on up the hierarchy. 
 However, there is a compelling objection to this approach.  Consider paradigm 
tall heights that aren’t borderline cases at any level.  Call these absolutely tall.  If every 
height must be classified as either absolutely tall, or absolutely not tall, or, for some 
natural number n, a borderline case of nth order, then there will be a sharp cut-off 
between those classified as absolutely tall and those classified some other way.  But there 
should not be a sharp cut-off here.
7
  Similarly, if every real number between 0 and 1 must 
be classified as either absolutely MC, or absolutely not MC, or, for some natural number 
n, a borderline case of nth order, then there will be a sharp cut-off between the numbers 
that are absolutely MC and those that are not.  But there is no sharp boundary here.   
A different class of views on vagueness involves multiple degrees of truth.
8
  Some 
postulate uncountably many: one for each number between 0 and 1, inclusive.  This view 
also faces the problem of higher order vagueness.  If we assign some precise degree of 
truth to every proposition of the form TALL(r), there will be a sharp cut-off between the 
numbers such that TALL(r) is true to degree 1, and the numbers such that TALL(r) is true 
to some degree less than 1.  But there should not be a sharp cut-off here. 
 The analogous model of belief, on which each proposition of the form MC(r) is 
assigned some precise degree of truth, suffers from the same problem: it requires a sharp 
cut-off between those numbers for which MC(r) is true to degree 1, and those for which 
MC(r) is true to some degree less than 1.  But again, there is no sharp boundary here. 
 
2. Insurmountable Unclassifiability 
 
 The orthodox Bayesian model of belief, as we have seen, is inaccurate.  The 
nature of the inaccuracy is that it requires point-valued credences, which, as we saw in 
the previous section, amounts to the requirement that there be sharp lines where, 
intuitively, there aren’t any—such as between MC and not-MC.  (MC(r) says, recall, that 
                                                                                                                                                 
still others Pr(A) = Pr(B), then it’s false that you’re more confident of A than B; false that you’re less 
confident of A than B; and false that you’re equally confident of A than B.  Your attitude towards A and B 
falls into a fourth category.  (This is analogous to a view in value theory defended, among others, by Ruth 
Chang (see, for example, Chang (2002)), on which it can be the case that A is neither more valuable than B, 
nor less valuable, nor equally valuable.)  This interpretation requires, implausibly, a sharp boundary 
between the numbers that have MC, and those that fall into the fourth category. 
 
7
 Similar problems are presented in Sainsbury (1991) and Wright (2009). 
8
 See, for example, Smith (2008) and Zadeh (1975). 
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you are more confident of B[r]—that a coin with bias r towards heads will land heads on 
the next toss—than LUCKY (that you will find a four-leaf clover tomorrow).) 
 So, we cannot use the two categories MC and not-MC to give an exhaustive 
classification of all numbers between 0 and 1.  In the previous section we surveyed a 
number of different attempts to reach a categorization that is genuinely exhaustive by 
refining this initial two-way distinction.  Specifically, each attempt involved adding more 
(in some cases, infinitely more) intermediate categories.  But all these attempts foundered 
on the same sort of problem: each ended up requiring sharp lines where, intuitively, there 
shouldn’t be any. 
 In fact, we can identify an even more substantive commonality among the sources 
of failure of these different attempts.  In each case, the proposed model failed because it 
ended up requiring a sharp line between those numbers for which MC(r) is as true as 
possible, and those for which it is not.  For example, consider the supervaluationist 
framework.  Here, to be determinately true is to be as true as possible, and to be 
indeterminately true is to fail to be as true as possible.  So the sharp line, required by this 
framework, between the determinate and the indeterminate amounts to a sharp line 
between what’s as true as possible and what’s not.  Postulating an infinite hierarchy of 
borderline cases doesn’t help; we still have a sharp line between what’s as true as possible 
(in this case, when MC(r) is absolutely true, not borderline at any level) and what’s not 
(when MC(r) is either a borderline case at some level, or absolutely false).  Many-valued 
logics require a sharp line between those numbers for which MC(r) is true to degree 1 (as 
true as possible), and those true to some degree less than 1 (not as true as possible). 
 The error that unifies these models, then, is their joint commitment to a sharp line 
between what’s true as possible and what’s not.  That there is no sharp line here imposes 
a severe restriction on our ability to classify the numbers between 0 and 1 according to 
their MC status.  This restriction can be stated more precisely, as follows: 
 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability:  For any set of categories C with properties (1) and 
(2) (definitions to follow), it is not the case that every number between 0 and 1 can be 
classified into some category in C.  (1) For some proper subset of C, any number r that 
falls into some category in that subset is, in virtue of being in that category, such that 
MC(r) is as true as possible.  (2) Any number r that falls into some category in C in the 
complement of that proper subset is, in virtue of being in that category, such that it’s not 
the case that MC(r) is as true as possible. 
 
 Insurmountable Unclassifiability is intended to capture the idea that, not only can 
we not classify all numbers along the two-way MC/not-MC distinction, but we also 
cannot classify all numbers according to any set of categories that is intended to 
supersede this two-way distinction, or refine it via the addition of (even infinitely many) 
more intermediate categories.
9
  What is wrong the initial two-way distinction is not that 
there are too few categories into which to sort numbers.  Rather, the fundamental problem 
is the exhaustiveness assumption.  The mistake is to think that every number can be 
                                                 
9
 Sainsbury (1991) sketches a view that has much in common with Insurmountable Unclassifiability. 
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assigned to some category that completely captures its status with respect to MC.  
Insurmountable Unclassifiability denies this.
10
 
 Now, it is clear that some numbers are classifiable in categories that are members 
of a set with properties (1) and (2).  What Insurmountable Unclassifiability denies is just 
that all numbers are so classifiable.  That some, but not all, numbers are so classifiable 
might lead one to think that we can draw a sharp line between those that are, and those 
that aren’t.  But, as we will see, this, too, is not possible.  That it’s not begins to illustrate 
the truly insurmountable nature of the unclassifiability. 
Suppose we were able to say, for each number, whether it was so classifiable or 
not.  If so, then, for each classifiable number r, we can say whether or not MC(r) is as 
true as possible.  (If we couldn’t, then r wouldn’t be in the classifiable category.)  So, 
there would be a sharp two-way distinction between, on the one hand, the numbers that 
are classifiable, and such that MC(r) is as true as possible; and, on the other, those that 
are either unclassifiable, or, classifiable, but not as such that MC(r) is as true as possible.  
But that would constitute a sharp two-way classification between the numbers for which 
MC(r) is as true as possible, and those for which it is not!  Each number in the first 
category—classifiable, and such that MC(r) is true as possible—is clearly such that 
MC(r) is true as possible.  Of the numbers in the second category, those that are 
classifiable, but not such that MC(r) is true as possible, are, obviously, not such that 
MC(r) is true as possible. And—crucially—those in the second category that are not 
classifiable are clearly such that it’s not the case that MC(r) is true as possible.  After all, 
if MC(r) were as true as possible, then that number would fall into the first category.  So 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability entails that, although some numbers are classifiable, and 
it’s not the case that all numbers are classifiable, we cannot categorize each number as 
either classifiable or not. 
As will become even more apparent later in the paper, Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability is quite a radical and mysterious view.  In this section I have argued, 
though, that accepting it is absolutely necessary if we are determined to avoid problems 
of the sort that plagued the orthodox Bayesian model and the myriad attempts, discussed 
in the previous section, to improve upon it.  That is, accepting Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability is absolutely necessary to avoid commitment to the existence of sharp 
lines where, intuitively, there shouldn’t be any.   
 
3. The Minimal Model 
 
 I began this paper by noting a trade-off between accuracy and specificity in two 
popular models of belief.  In the section following this one I will show that if 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability is true, then this trade-off is in principle unavoidable: it 
                                                 
10
 Those with supervaluationist inclinations might think the solution is to posit a third category, consisting 
of borderline cases of the distinction between what’s as true as possible and what’s not.  But there can be no 
borderlines of this distinction.  Suppose there were.  Then there would be a distinction between the 
determinately true as possible, and the borderline true as possible.  Consider an instance of the second 
category.  Since it is determinately in the second category, rather than the first, it determinedly fails to be as 
true as it possibly could be.  (It could be in the first category.)  So what we would have is not borderline as 
true as possible, but rather, determinately not as true as possible.  It is part of the nature of the distinction 
between what’s as true as possible, and what’s not, that there can be no borderlines of it.  (Compare the 
argument in Broome (1997) for his Collapsing Principle and an argument in Barnes (1982), p. 55.) 
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is impossible to characterize belief in a way that is both fully accurate and maximally 
specific.  In order to do this, I will first construct a new way of using interval notation and 
sets of functions to represent belief, which I call the minimal model.  That is the aim of 
this section.  As we will soon see, it turns out that this minimal model constitutes an 
improvement over both the tripartite model and existing Bayesian models: it allows for 
much greater specificity than the tripartite model, and yet remains, unlike existing 
Bayesian models, perfectly accurate. 
 First, notice that among informal characterizations of belief, some are more 
specific than others.  For example, suppose I say you’re more confident of P than not, and 
then elaborate that you’re nearly certain of P.  The second description is more specific 
than the first, but both are perfectly accurate.  The new minimal interpretation of sets and 
intervals presented here allows us to give, in a similar fashion, multiple accurate 
characterizations, at different levels of specificity, of a single agent’s doxastic state.   
I’ll start with intervals.  First I’ll give a definition that is helpful, but potentially 
misleading; then I’ll do it more carefully.  Helpful, but misleading: on the minimal 
interpretation, [c, d] accurately characterizes an agent’s doxastic state toward H just in 
case the agent’s level of confidence in H is contained within [c, d].  Note that on this 
interpretation there will always be multiple accurate intervals at varying levels of 
specificity.  On reason is that, if [c, d] is accurate, then any larger (more inclusive) 
interval is also accurate.  This is because, if one’s level of confidence is contained within 
[c, d], then it is contained within any interval of which [c, d] is a subset.  For example, 
since I am fairly confident that LUCKY is false, my doxastic attitude toward LUCKY is 
accurately characterized by [0, 1], [0, .8], [0, .5], and many others.  On the minimal 
interpretation, each of these is perfectly accurate; some are more specific than others. 
The definition given above is misleading insofar as it presupposes that the agent 
has a precise, point-valued level of confidence.  The fix is: on the minimal interpretation, 
an interval [c, d] accurately characterizes an agent’s doxastic state toward H just in case 
(1) the agent is more confident of H than any proposition in which her credence is less 
than c; and (2) the agent is less confident of H than any proposition in which her credence 
is greater than d.  One final clarification: the conditions on the right-hand side must be as 
true as possible for the interval to count as accurate. 
 One noteworthy feature of this new use of intervals is that it is entirely compatible 
with the substantive views held by proponents of different views on credal imprecision, 
including the supervaluationist interpretation, an infinite hierarchy of borderline cases, 
many-valued logics, Insurmountable Unclassifiability, even the single-function model, 
etc.  For example, if the supervaluationist has [c, d] as the agent’s unique interval-valued 
credence in H, then that interval (as well as any more inclusive interval) automatically 
counts as accurate on the minimal interpretation.  This is because the supervaluationist 
interpretation of the interval notation is logically stronger than the minimal interpretation 
of the same notation (hence the name minimal).  For another example, if one has a point-
valued credence c in H, then every interval of which c is a member will count as accurate 
on the minimal interpretation.  What this makes salient is that to characterize an agent’s 
doxastic attitude using the new, minimal interval notation is to remain neutral on the 
issues that divide defenders of all different views on credal (im)precision.  This is 
because, on the minimal interpretation, to characterize an agent’s attitude towards H with 
some interval is to remain completely neutral about the status of numbers inside that 
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interval.  For any such number r, it may be that one is more confident of H than B[r]; or 
less confident; or equally confident; it may be indeterminate whether r is one’s level of 
confidence in H; etc.  For any possible status r might have, we remain completely neutral 
about whether r has that status.  To describe one’s attitude with an interval is to be 
committal only about numbers outside that interval. 
 We can give a new, minimal re-interpretation of sets of functions in the same vein.  
First pass: a set counts as accurate just in case every proposition about the agent’s 
doxastic state that is true according to all functions in that set is true (as possible) of the 
agent.  This is only a first-pass definition, though, because some propositions true 
according to all functions in the set are not true of the agent.  For example, it is true 
according to every function in the set that you have a precise credence in LUCKY.  (The 
functions agree that you have a precise credence; they just disagree about what it is.)  But 
that you have a precise credence in LUCKY is precisely what we want to deny!  We can 
get to the root of this problem by noticing that, although the existential claim there is 
some real number r such that r is your precise credence in LUCKY is true according to 
every function, there is no instance of that existential claim that is true according to every 
function; that is, there is no r such that r is your precise credence in LUCKY is true 
according to every function in the set.  So, we can fix the problem by revising the 
definition as follows: First, let Z be the set of all propositions true according to all 
functions in the set.  Generate Z- by removing from Z any proposition that is, or is 
equivalent to, some existential claim such that no instance of that existential claim is true 
according to every function in the set.  Now the proper definition: on the minimal 
interpretation, a set counts as accurate just in case every proposition in Z- is true (as 
possible) of the agent.   
 To characterize an agent with a set, on this new, minimal interpretation, is to 
remain entirely neutral on the status of propositions about which different functions in the 
set disagree, just as the minimal interval notation remains neutral on the status of 
numbers inside the interval.  There will always be multiple accurate sets, just as there are 
always multiple accurate intervals.  In addition, as before, this interpretation is 
compatible with different views on credal imprecision.  For example, if S is the agent’s 
unique set of functions, interpreted in the supervaluationist way, then S (and any more 
inclusive set) counts as an accurate description of that agent on the minimal 
interpretation.  If an agent is best represented by a single credence function, any set 
containing that function is accurate.   
 This minimal model can easily accommodate traditional Bayesian approaches to a 
wide range of different issues, such as learning from experience, theory confirmation in 
science, decision theory, etc.  It will typically be the case that if, on the single-function 
model, some proposition B is true of an agent if that agent’s credence function has 
property Q, then, on the minimal model, B will be true of the agent if there is some set of 
functions, which accurately characterizes that agent, all of whose members have property 
Q.  For example, on the minimal model we can say that E confirms H if there is some 
accurate set of functions, all of whose members have Pr(H|E) > Pr(H).  The agent 
satisfies minimal synchronic requirements for rationality if there is some accurate set of 
functions, all of whose members conform to the axioms of probability.  The agent 
rationally updates on evidence E, received between t1 and t2, just any case any set of 
 10 
 
functions S2 that is accurate at t2 can be obtained from some set S1 that was accurate at 
t1 via conditionalizing each function in S1 on E.  And so forth. 
What I want to emphasize here, though, is that when it comes to the 
representation of belief, the minimal model is an improvement over both the tripartite 
model and existing Bayesian models.  It allows for characterizations much more specific 
than those of the tripartite model.  For example, if [.95, .96] accurately characterizes my 
attitude toward A, and [.97, .98] my attitude toward B, the model represents that I am 
more confident of B than A, even if I believe both.  Yet it remains (unlike existing 
Bayesian models) perfectly accurate.  It does not fall prey to the problem of arbitrariness, 
since accurate intervals are not taken to be uniquely accurate.  It is perfectly accurate to 
characterize my attitude toward LUCKY with [0, .8], even though the endpoints are 
perfectly precise, because this characterization is not taken to be a unique best one.  Other 
intervals, such as [0, .7] or [0, .6], may be equally accurate. 
The only shortcoming of this model is that it typically provides only partial 
descriptions of the agent’s doxastic state.  To characterize one’s doxastic state with [0, .7], 
for example, is not maximally informative, since narrower intervals may be equally 
accurate.  Whether this shortcoming can be remedied is addressed in the next section. 
 
4. Insurmountable Unclassifiability Renders Impossible the Combination of  
Perfect Accuracy and Maximal Specificity in the Representation of Belief 
 
In the previous section I constructed the minimal model, which allows us to give 
multiple accurate descriptions of an agent’s doxastic state at different levels of specificity.  
It is fine to characterize one’s doxastic state by giving a few descriptions of this kind, but 
doing so raises a natural question.  What is the most specific accurate interval?  For 
example, above I listed the following as accurate characterizations of my attitude toward 
LUCKY: [0, 1], [0, .8], and [0, .5].  Having done this, it is natural to ask about other 
intervals.  What about [0, .3]?  (0, .27)?  [0, .2]?  In particular, it is natural to wonder 
which interval is the most specific interval that is still accurate.  After all, any information 
encoded in a less specific interval is also contained in a more specific interval—so why 
not just isolate the maximally specific accurate interval, identify it as such, and forget 
about the rest? 
 Interestingly, it turns out that if we are serious about avoiding counterintuitive 
sharp lines—i.e, if we accept Insurmountable Unclassifiability—then we must regard this 
very natural thought as deeply flawed.  Suppose there were a most specific interval that 
accurately characterized my attitude towards LUCKY—say, [c, d].  Then any narrower 
interval would fail to be accurate.  But then d would constitute a precise boundary where 
there shouldn’t be one.  For all numbers greater than d, MC(r) would be as true as 
possible; for all numbers equal to or less than d, MC(r) would fail to be as true as 
possible.  But, as we have seen, Insurmountable Unclassifiability entails that we can’t 
classify all numbers r according to this scheme.  The upshot: if we accept Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability—the only way to avoid problems of arbitrariness and higher-order 
vagueness—then sometimes there is no maximally specific, fully accurate 
characterization of one’s doxastic state. 
 This is a surprising and radical conclusion.  It means that it is impossible to give a 
complete description of an agent’s doxastic state; there is no such thing as a complete 
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description.  We can give partial descriptions of an agent’s doxastic state; some will be 
more specific than others.  But we can never identify a particular description as 
maximally specific, or complete.
11
 
 
5. Quietism and the Forced March 
 
 In order to draw out some further implications of Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability, consider a forced march scenario.  Consider the following finite series 
of intervals.  All intervals in the series share the same lower endpoint: 0.  The upper 
endpoint of the first element of the series is 1.  For each interval in the series, its upper 
endpoint is the result of subtracting some minuscule positive real number ε from the 
upper endpoint of its predecessor.  The last element of the series is the first interval whose 
upper endpoint is equal to or less than 0. 
 Imagine going through the elements of this series one by one, and asking 
someone, for each interval, whether it is accurate concerning their level of confidence in 
LUCKY.  At first, the obvious answer is yes.  But at some point, the response must be 
something else.  (Otherwise the person will answer yes to the last element of the series, 
which is clearly incorrect.)  But what can they say? 
 It follows from Insurmountable Unclassifiability that in order to avoid error, the 
speaker is at some point required to perform a speech act that is non-committal in the 
following sense: the content of the speech act is compatible with its being the case that 
yes would have been a correct answer; and also compatible with its being the case that 
yes would have been an incorrect answer.  Which speech act may have these features is 
an empirical question.  Silence is a natural candidate—but only if it’s understood not to 
implicate that the answer is not yes.  The person might say “I’m bored of this.  Let’s go 
swimming!” or “Was that a Pileated Woodpecker that just flew by?” 
 This suggestion—that, at some point, one must switch to a non-committal speech 
act—may strike some as unsatisfying.  Those who find it unsatisfying may try to stipulate 
that the subject will say yes if and only if yes would be a correct answer.  Then speech 
acts like “Let’s go swimming!” won’t allow them to wriggle out of the question. 
 However, a defender of Insurmountable Unclassifiability should deny that such a 
stipulation can be made.  On the assumption that, for each question, there is a fact of the 
matter about whether not the subject responded with yes, then the claim that they will say 
yes if and only if yes is a correct answer is equivalent to the claim that, for each interval, 
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 How might this affect other issues, such as updating, decision theory, etc.?  In a sense, not at all—these 
are still handled in the minimal model exactly as described in the previous section.  But Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability introduces a new wrinkle: there is now no guarantee that there will be a fact of the matter 
about whether the relevant conditions obtain (although there may always be a fact of the matter).  For 
example, on the minimal model we have that if there is some accurate set of functions, all of whose 
members have Pr(H|E) > Pr(H), then E confirms H.  And if there is no accurate set of functions, all of 
whose members have Pr(H|E) > Pr(H), then it’s not the case that E confirms H.  But since, according to 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability, it’s not the case that every set is classifiable as either accurate or not, the 
door is now open to the possibility that it will not be settled whether E confirms H.  It is important to 
emphasize, however, that Insurmountable Unclassifiability does not require that there sometimes fail to be 
a fact of the matter here.  It is compatible with Insurmountable Unclassifiability that there is always a fact 
of the matter about whether E confirms H.  The same goes for other issues, such as rational updating, 
minimal constraints on synchronic rationality, etc. 
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there’s a fact of the matter about whether it’s accurate or not.  And the denial of this is a 
core commitment of Insurmountable Unclassifiability. 
 What we are left with, then, is a form of Quietism.  For any subject of the forced 
march, it must be the case that there is some pair of adjacent intervals such that they 
answer yes to the question about one but give a different answer to the question about the 
other.  That answer must be non-committal in the sense described above. 
 This section has only begun to explore the implications of Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability; many further questions remain.  Already, though, we can see that it 
leads to some surprising, radical, and mysterious conclusions.  Those who are serious 
about avoiding the problems of arbitrariness, higher-order vagueness, and 
counterintuitive sharp lines are in for some exciting times! 
 
6.  Dissolving Problems with Insurmountable Unclassifiability 
 
 My goal in this section is to highlight some of the virtues of Insurmountable 
Unclassifiability by showing how it dissolves two challenging problems: (1) puzzle cases 
for the Principle of Indifference; (2) diachronic decision problems for agents who lack 
precise credences.   
 The much-discussed Principle of Indifference (POI) says that if one has no more 
reason to believe A than B, and no more reason to believe B than A, then one’s credence 
in A should equal one’s credence in B.12  In the orthodox Bayesian model, where 
credences are point-valued, this famously seems to lead to contradiction in some cases.  
For example, suppose a factory produces cubes of equal size.
13
  You know only that the 
length (L) of a side of a cube is 2 feet or less.  Plausibly, you have no more reason to 
believe 0 < L ≤ 1 than 1 < L ≤ 2, and vice versa; so, according to POI, you must have the 
same point-valued credence in each of these propositions, namely, ½.  But now notice 
that your initial information is equivalent to the information that the area (A) of a side is 
4 feet or less.  Now it seems you have no more reason to believe any one of these four 
possibilities than any of the others: 0 < A ≤ 1; 1 < A ≤ 2; 2 < A ≤ 3; 3 < A ≤ 4.  So, 
according to POI, you must have the same point-valued credence in each, namely, ¼.  But 
this contradicts the recommendation of the first application of the principle, since 0 < L ≤ 
1 is equivalent to 0 < A ≤ 1. 
 Some (including Joyce (2005) and Weatherson (2007)) have claimed that moving 
to the set-of-functions model—with the attendant move to interval-valued credences—
solves the problem: that we can respect both verdicts of the POI by giving the same 
(unique, maximally specific) interval-valued credence to each member of the two-celled 
partition, and the same (unique, maximally specific) interval-valued credence to each 
member of the four-valued partition.  However, as I have shown elsewhere [reference 
removed for blind review], this is coherent only if one’s interval-valued credence in all 
six is [0, 1].  And, as I have argued elsewhere, (maximally specific) interval-valued 
credences with such extreme endpoints are not rationally permissible [reference removed 
for blind review]. 
 This entire set of problems evaporates if Insurmountable Unclassifiability is 
adopted—specifically, if we give up the presupposition that we must have a maximally 
                                                 
12
 For some recent discussion, see, among others, White (2010) and Huemer (2009). 
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 Example adapted from Van Fraassen (1989). 
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specific, fully accurate interval-valued or point-valued credence in each proposition.  
First, we can use the minimal model to re-state the POI in a way compatible with 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability, as follows: if one has no more reason to believe A than 
B, and no more reason to believe B than A, then, if one is rational, then if some interval R 
is an accurate characterization of one’s attitude toward A, then that same interval R is also 
an accurate characterization of one’s attitude toward B, and vice versa.  This principle 
does not lead to contradiction, even if we agree that you have no more reason to believe 0 
< L ≤ 1 than 1 < L ≤ 2, and no more reason to believe any of the following than any 
other: 0 < A ≤ 1; 1 < A ≤ 2; 2 < A ≤ 3; 3 < A ≤ 4.  For example, each of the following 
intervals can coherently accurately characterize your attitude toward each of these six 
propositions: [0, .75]; [.12, .8]; [.011, .673]; etc.  With Insurmountable Unclassifiability 
in place, there is no longer any requirement to find a maximally specific accurate interval 
for each proposition—and it is this requirement that we should give up in light of the 
contradiction, not the innocuous principle that when you have no more reason to believe 
one thing than another, you shouldn’t take different doxastic attitudes towards them. 
 Giving up this requirement also pulls the rug out from under an argument in Elga 
(2010) for the claim that rationality requires us to have a precise, point-valued credence 
in every proposition.  Elga draws this conclusion after considering a number of different 
possible decision rules one might use if one had a (unique, maximally specific) interval-
valued credence in some proposition.  In each case, he argues that the rule is 
unacceptable.  He infers that it is not rational to have a (unique, maximally specific) 
interval-valued credence in any proposition; and concludes from this that all rational 
credences are point-valued. 
 Once Insurmountable Unclassifiability is on the table, it’s clear that the final step 
in Elga’s argument is invalid.  Elga does not consider the possibility that rationality might 
allow one to lack a point-valued credence and also lack a unique, maximally specific 
interval-valued credence.
14
  I will argue that the decision theory that accompanies 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability gives the right results about the case on which, Elga 
claims, the view that we have a (maximally specific) interval-valued credence founders. 
 Elga supposes that the agent has a maximally specific credence in H of [.1, .8].  
He then supposes the agent is offered some bet A, immediately followed by another bet 
B.  If the agent accepts bet A, she will gain $15 if H is true but lose $10 if H is false.  If 
she accepts bet B, she will lose $10 if H is true, but gain $15 if H is false.  The thing to 
notice is that if the agent accepts both bets, she is guaranteed to gain $5.  Of course, 
rejecting both guarantees $0.  So it would be irrational to reject both bets.  (We assume 
the agent cares only about money, etc.)  But, Elga claims, no decision theory for 
(maximally specific) interval-valued credences can accommodate this.  For example, 
according to one popular rule that has been frequently endorsed in the literature, rejecting 
bet A is permissible, and rejecting bet B is permissible as well.   
 Now, suppose that, in accordance with Insurmountable Unclassifiability, the agent 
in this case lacks a maximally specific interval-valued credence, but that [.1, .8] is an 
accurate characterization (in the minimal model) of their doxastic attitude.  What 
decision-theoretic commitments would follow?  As we have seen, the minimal model 
remains completely silent on matters about which different functions in some accurate set 
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disagree.  In this case, since [.1, .8] is an accurate interval, there will be some accurate set 
which contains, for each value v in [.1, .8], some function with Pr(H) = v.  Some 
functions in that set have the expected value of rejecting bet A greater than accepting, but 
others have the expected value of accepting greater than rejecting.  There is no agreement 
among the members of this set about whether rejecting is permissible or not.  So the 
minimal model remains completely silent on that question.  The same is true for bet B.  
This is good news—the minimal model does not have the implausible consequence that 
rejecting each bet is permissible. 
 However, we might wonder whether we can also do justice to the intuition that 
rejecting both bets would be impermissible.  In fact, we can!  Although the minimal 
model does not prohibit the individual action of rejecting bet A; and does not prohibit 
rejecting bet B; it does prohibit the compound action of rejecting both bets.  This is 
because every function in that accurate set agrees that the expected value of rejecting 
both bets is $0, and that the expected value of accepting both bets is $5; and so all 
functions agree that rejecting both bets is rationally impermissible.  The minimal model 
yields exactly the result that Elga claimed no decision theory for non-precise credences 
could accommodate.
15
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 I began by noting a trade-off between accuracy and specificity in two commonly-
employed models of belief.  The tripartite model, which recognizes only three doxastic 
attitudes, allows us to characterize belief in a way that is perfectly accurate, but not 
sufficiently specific.  The model is too coarse-grained.  The orthodox Bayesian model, on 
the other hand, is too fine-grained.  It represents agents in a way that is highly specific, 
but typically inaccurate.  It requires point-valued credences in every proposition, but 
usually our doxastic attitudes are not this precise (nor does rationality require them to be).  
A popular modification of the Bayesian model—the set-of-functions model—suffers 
from a similar sort of problem.  It requires a unique interval-valued credence, with 
perfectly precise endpoints, for each proposition.  But our doxastic attitudes are usually 
not this precise either (nor does rationality require them to be). 
I have shown that if Insurmountable Unclassifiability is true, then this trade-off 
between accuracy and specificity is in-principle unavoidable: it is simply not possible to 
characterize belief in a way that is both fully accurate and maximally specific.  I gave a 
powerful reason in favor of this principle: it is, I argued, non-negotiable for those serious 
about avoiding the problem of inaccuracy due to overprecision in the representation of 
belief, and the analogous problem of higher order vagueness.  Moreover, it can dissolve 
two challenging problems: puzzle cases for the Principle of Indifference, and diachronic 
decision problems for agents who lack point-valued credences. 
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 One thing this discussion reveals is that Elga’s argument against some other decision rules is too quick. 
For example, what he calls permissive rules have the same verdict as the minimal model—that the 
compound action of rejecting both bets is impermissible—for similar reasons.  However, this is 
complicated by the fact that according to these rules, rejecting bet A is permissible, as is rejecting bet B.  So 
they are committed to the implausible result that a certain compound action is impermissible even though 
each component action is permissible.  The combination of Insurmountable Unclassifiability and the 
minimal model has no such implausible commitment. 
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However, it has not been my aim in this paper to reach a final verdict on 
Insurmountable Unclassifiability.  It will doubtless be controversial; some of its 
consequences are surprising and radical.  For example, it entails that the subject in a 
forced march scenario is required, at some point, to respond in a way that is maximally 
non-committal on the question asked.   
 Regardless of whether or not we accept this fascinating and mysterious view, we 
can improve on both the tripartite model and the existing Bayesian models of belief.  One 
aim of the paper has been to describe and promote a new model of belief—the minimal 
model—that enables us to use intervals, and sets of functions, to characterize belief in a 
way that is much more specific than the tripartite model, and yet which does not fall prey 
to problems of overprecision and so is perfectly accurate.  A further virtue of the minimal 
model is that it remains neutral on the issues that divide defenders of different approaches 
to the problem of higher order vagueness.  Thus, it provides a framework within which 
we can make progress on a wide range of different issues in epistemology and decision 
theory without first having to take a stand on this challenging and controversial problem. 
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